Civil-military relations in peace operations: the Danish experience

It is common sense that armed conflicts can not be overcome by military means alone. There is the need to find ways to combine civil and military instruments in peace operations. However concepts to approaches of civil-military cooperation are diverse and common language or definitions to understand them need to be found.

A Synthesis Report of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) combines the work of DIIS and partner organisations looking at civil-military engagement within Danish missions in Iraq (see separate study) and Afghanistan (see separate study). The report looks at the coherence challenge within and between Danish institutions involved, harmonization efforts with other international players, as well as at the alignment with local and national actors.

It recommends to increase sharing of analyses, lessons-learned and the development of common guidelines for civil-military relations, including standards for civil-military monitoring and evaluations. With regard to the host nation and local level the challenge remains to use local knowledge effectively. Additionally the linkages between national and regional levels need more attention. Furthermore understanding local perceptions of security and the protection of the population need higher priority. The report also makes very specific recommendations regarding the Danish institutional set-up and policy framework.

The synthesis report is part of DIIS research on 'Civil-Military Relations within International Peace Operations' with publications also concerning other European countries. See also for example: 'Integrated National Approaches to International Operations. The cases of Denmark, UK and the Netherlands'.

by Martin Behrens

See the Euforic newsfeed and dossier on peace and security

As well as ICCO on Democratization and Peacebuilding

Escalation of violence in Afghanistan: Political consequences for the German engagement

Although the engagement of the international community has widened in geographical scope, time frame and deployment over the last 7 years, the situation in Afghanistan remains extremely fragile. Even the newly elected US President Obama recently stated that the war cannot be won and suggested negotiations with moderate Taliban leaders.

A Policy Paper (pdf in German) of the German Development and Peace Foundation looks at the underlying causes of the impasse and formulates policy recommendations for the international community in general and German decision makers more in particular.

Increasing violence in Afghanistan raises pressure to deploy more troops, however there is evidence that the rapid expansion of the international military presence is one of the causes of the insecure situation. The authors are convinced that a political solution needs to be found. Therefore, Germany should resist sending more military. The existing troops should have a clear mandate as stabilization and security force and should not be involved in combat operations.

As the main reason for the persistent fragility the author identifies the failed state-building in Afghanistan. A central government was quickly installed, however further steps to extend state power to the Afghan provinces were not made. In fact several actions of the central government and the international community spoiled the prestige of the government in Kabul.

Firstly one could point at the centralization of governance in contrast to Afghanistan's heterogeneity, and the actual lack of capacity of the Kabul institutions to meet the expectations. Secondly there was the cooperation of Kabul with former warlords that were discredited by the Afghan population. The failure of the international community to build a reliable legal system and police force, to a big share under the responsibility of the German government, further worsened the situation. Also the reconstruction and humanitarian activities did not support the state-building process. The demand for fast results led to an approach that favored local initiatives and international NGOs for the implementation instead of state involvement.

The authors demand a rethinking of the Afghanistan Strategy and a strong support of the state-building process. Only when state-building becomes the main priority of the international community in Afghanistan, the German government should consider an enhanced engagement with human and financial resources.

by Martin Behrens

See the Euforic newsfeed and dossier on peace and security

See also ICCO on Democratization and Peacebuilding

German NGOs criticize military engagement in reconstructing Afghanistan

Venro, the German Association of NGDOs, criticize (pdf in German) the so called 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan under German command.

The teams, which usually consist of 250-300 soldiers plus some civil experts, aim to promote security and stability in the Afghan provinces and actively engage in reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, security sector reform and political dialogue with the Afghan population. According to Venro, these measures are meant to enhance the acceptance of the military thus increase force protection.

The German NGOs claim that the overlap of military and civil activities spoils the neutrality of NGOs thus worsening their security situation. While development actors are strictly guided by a humanitarian imperative, the German military which is increasingly engaging in combat missions follows clear political interests thus is part of the conflict environment.

The authors quote a statement by the International Red Cross: “The distinction between humanitarian, political and military action becomes blurred when armed forces are perceived as being humanitarian actors, when civilians are embedded into military structures, and when the impression is created that humanitarian organizations and their personnel are merely tools within integrated approaches to conflict management. "

The report demands that the German military concentrates on stabilizing and security activities which should primarily serve the Afghan population and leave humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development assistance to civil actors.

The report further argues that the advantages for force protection due to reconstruction activities of the military are hardly evident and are clearly outweighed by the risks for civil personnel. Additionally Venro demands a military exit strategy which would increase the credibility by showing that the international community is striving to bring peace and security to Afghanistan and does not only look for its own strategic interests.

by Martin Behrens

See the Euforic news alert and dossier for more on peace and security.

See also Euforic's dossier and news alert on German's international cooperation activities.